Sony DRM - The Conceptual Problems

Ian Fogg | December 01, 2005, 03:55 PM

Much has been written about the Sony CD DRM / rootkit issue. However, almost all coverage has attacked the inept execution (or recall, or sticky tape workarounds) rather than the core concept.

My problem is more fundamental. The useful life of a CD is much longer than the Windows XP operating system that this DRM software tightly binds itself into. This DRM software must avoid crashing future versions of Windows, which is impossible to guarantee for such unfinished operating systems (especially as it has failed to deliver sufficient reliability for the known quantity that is the current version of Windows).

I have several music CDs from the 90s that include ancient versions of Quicktime and DirectX that I'm reluctant to run on my current PC. In a few years, such CDs will have to work with the next version of Windows, Vista, and Mac OS 12 and everything else. It's an impossible task for a third party developer (i.e. everyone bar Microsoft) given the extent to which such copy protection must interoperate with Windows.

Second, I'm unconvinced about the merits of putting any copy protection onto a music CD. It takes just one person to break/bypass the protection and publish the music onto a file sharing network and then anyone can download the album. No CD protection developed to date has ever been able to stop all piracy. I suspect such efforts are futile and will inevitably hinder legimitate customers from enjoying their music in the process of attempting to stop the pirates.

The industry should be pursuing other solutions to market music and combat piracy. Read this JupiterResearch report for our take, or ask us for specfic advice on your particular products or services.